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Abstract. In modern political science, repeated elections are considered as the main 
mechanism of electoral accountability in democracies. More rarely, elections are 
considered as ways to select “good types” of politicians. In this article it is argued that 
historical republican authors interpreted elections in this last sense. They view elections 
as a means to select what they often called the “natural aristocracy”, virtuous political 
leaders that would pursue the common good. This argument is presented in three steps. 
First, it is claimed that republican authors did not considered retrospective 
accountability as one of the goals of electoral processes. Second, I present some 
evidence concerning the distinction in republican authors between two types of 
politicians, “good” and “bad”. And, finally, I present some republican arguments about 
how elections could serve as a device for selecting the “good” politicians.  
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Screening before sanctioning. Elections and the republican tradition 
 
1. Introduction.  
 
In democratic theory, elections have traditionally been considered as a 
mechanism of accountability, a sanctioning device to induce politicians to do what 
voters want.1 This view of elections as instruments of accountability faces some 
important problems. Perhaps the most cited in the literature is the asymmetries in 
information between voters and politicians. It is a well-proven fact in political science 
that most voters do not pay much attention to politics.2 Given that voters do not have 
enough information about the government’s performance, they cannot make a 
retrospective evaluation of that performance at the end of the term and, therefore, the 
government lacks the adequate incentive to act in the interest of the voters.  
An alternative to considering elections as instruments of accountability is to 
consider them as a mechanism to select “good types”, that is, politicians that will pursue 
the interests of their constituents. This conceptualization of elections as a selection 
process has been advanced by Fearon.3 In this paper, I will argue that republican authors 
portrayed elections precisely in this way, as a mechanism for the selection of good 
types, whom they usually called “natural aristocracy”. His view of representation was a 
combination of screening devices in order to identify virtuous politicians that will 
pursue the common good of the Republic, and sanctioning devices to maintain the 
politician virtuous while in office. But they did not consider, except in rare occasions, 
elections as mechanisms of retrospective accountability of the politicians’ performance.   
I will structure the paper as follows. In section two, I will present the two models 
of elections: as mechanisms of accountability and as mechanisms to select good types. 
                                                          
 
1 John Ferejohn (1986) “Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control”, Public Choice 50: 5-25; Morris 
P. Fiorina (1981) Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press; Bernard Manin (1997) The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press  
 
2 P. E. Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics” in D. E. Apter (ed) (1964) Ideology 
and Discontent. New York: Free Press; Robert C. Luskin (1987) “Measuring Political Sophistication”, 
American Journal of Political Science 31: 856-99 
  
3 James D. Fearon, “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus 
Sanctioning Poor Performance” in Przeworski, Manin and Stokes (eds) (1999) Democracy, 
Accountability and Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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In section three, I will argue that republican authors did not consider elections as 
mechanisms of accountability. In sections four and five, I will present the argument that 
republicans considered elections as a way to select good types of politicians. 
  
2. The limits of electoral accountability 
 
The relation between representatives and constituents can be pictured using an 
agency model. In this agency model, the citizens are the principal and the 
representatives are their agents. As in all agency models, there are information 
asymmetries between principal and agent. Specifically, the agent has private 
information about the level of effort he has invested in the implementation of the 
policies, or about the foreseeable consequences of different courses of policies, or both. 
The principal wants to make his agent accountable for his behavior and, according to 
most political scientists, the main mechanism of accountability is repeated elections. In 
elections, the principal makes a retrospective evaluation of his agent’s behavior. If 
elections are repeated and politicians have an interest in remaining in power, they will 
fulfill the voters’ interests.4 The problem with this mechanism of accountability is that 
the threat of an unfavorable evaluation is an adequate incentive for the contract between 
agent and principal only if the principal has enough information about the behavior of 
his agent and it is mostly assumed that voters do not have enough information about the 
policy process.5 Among other things, it has been claimed that citizens do not have a 
consistent understanding of ideological abstractions6, that they are incapable of 
recognizing the names of their elected representatives7 or even that they are incapable of 
organizing political beliefs within a coherent framework.8 Although there are probably 
huge differences between the levels of political information of different groups of 
                                                          
4 V. O. Key (1966) The Responsible Electorate. New York: Vintage Books; Ferejohn (n. 1); Manin (n. 1) 
  
5 Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski and Susan Stokes, “Elections and Representation” in Przeworski, 
Manin and Stokes (eds) (1999) Democracy, Accountability and Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; John Ferejohn, “Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political 
Accountability”, in Przeworski, Manin and Stokes (eds) (1999) Democracy, Accountability and 
Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
  
6 Converse (n. 2) 
 
7 G. C. Jacobson (1992) The Politics of Congressional Elections. New York: HarperCollins. 
  
8 Luskin (n. 2) 
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individuals, it is consistently demonstrated that only a small minority of the public pays 
attention to politics and is reasonably well informed about politicians and political 
issues.9 In fact, it is often assumed that this lack of information is, to a great extent, 
rational: the investment in gathering and processing political information is costly and 
the payoffs of this investment are uncertain (given the low probability that the formation 
of well-founded political opinions by the citizen will have any impact in real policies).10 
Besides this problem of asymmetric information between representatives and 
constituents, there are another two limits to electoral accountability: electoral 
heterogeneity makes it possible for officials to play off some voters against others to 
undermine their accountability to anyone and, given that electoral accountability 
operates periodically, officials can also avoid electoral responsibility for particular 
actions by grouping unpopular actions with popular ones.11  
We have, then, an agent model where the principal apparently has no incentives 
to invest in information about his agent’s behavior and, as a consequence, the agent has 
no incentives to fulfill the interests of the principal.  
Given the problems of elections as tools to make politicians accountable, Fearon 
has proposed to see elections, instead, as a means to select “good types”.12 As Fearon 
puts it “there is no logical reason why elections must be understood as a part of a 
relationship of accountability or agency.13 For example, a group of people may 
understand elections as a means of selecting or conferring honor on the best or most 
distinguished person”. This theory is based on assumptions about electors’ behavior 
completely different from the assumptions of the retrospective theory of elections as 
                                                          
9 John R. Zaller (1992) The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinions. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 16 
  
10 Samuel Popkin (1991) The Reasoning Voter. Communication and Persuasion in Presidential 
Campaigns. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 10 
  
11 Ferejohn (n. 5), p. 132 
 
12 Fearon (n. 3). Fearon’s model of elections as a selection device has been related by Jane Mansbridge 
((2003) “Rethinking Representation”, American Political Science Review 97 (4): 515-528, p. 521) to what 
she calls “gyroscopic representation”, a model of representation in which voters select representatives 
who can be expected to perform in ways the voter approves, as, for example, a person of integrity with a 
commitment to the public good. It seems that the standard interpretation of elections as a device for 
retrospective accountability is more accurately associated with what Mansbridge calls “promissory 
representation”. This would be another difference between Fearon’s model and the standard 
accountability model of elections. While this is interesting, in this paper I will not deal explicitly with the 
model of representation associated to each interpretation of elections. 
 
13 Fearon (n. 3), p. 57 
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mechanisms of accountability. First, accountability theories implicitly assume that there 
are no differences in the competence and integrity of politicians. However, politicians 
do differ in their competence or integrity. On the one hand, a great part of the debate in 
a campaign is referred neither to the content of the future policies nor to the 
performance of the government but to the personal attributes of the candidates. The 
parties spend many efforts in devaluating with ethical accusations of corruption or 
dishonesty the candidate of the competing party. On the other hand, the electors put a 
high value on candidates’ honesty and principles. Second, accountability models also 
assume that citizens believe that they can evaluate the government for its performance, 
that is, that citizens can interpret whether government policies are implemented in their 
behalf. These two assumptions, as we have said, are not very realistic. If we take into 
account the information problems of citizens to interpret the consequences of 
government’s policies and the differences in the politicians’ types, it is more probable 
that citizens understand the vote as a means of selecting good politicians rather than of 
punishing governments for a bad past performance.  
According to Fearon “good types” are those politicians who share electors’ 
interests, have moral integrity and are competent.14 To distinguish “good types” from 
“bad types” citizens can use a variety of signals. For instance, citizens’ welfare could be 
a relevant signal for electors of the competence of the government they have. Non 
policy cues about the character of the politicians are also relevant pieces of information 
for the selection model. In this sense, it could be argued that the fulfillment of electoral 
promises can be an informative signal of politicians’ credibility. In the theories based on 
the prospective behavior of electors, promises were a source of information for the 
future policies of the government. In Fearon’s view, the fulfillment of promises is also 
important but as a signal of government honesty. Credibility is one of the variables that 
citizens use to select their governments. For this reason, a switch, for example, from 
popular catch-all policies during campaign to hard economic adjustment when in office 
can damage governments.  
In the rest of this paper, I will argue that republican authors considered elections as a 
form of selecting “good types”, much in line with Fearon’s arguments, instead of as a 
way to make government accountable. By republican authors, I mean a tradition in 
political theory that ranges from Cicero in the Roman Republic, the civic humanist of 
                                                          
14 Fearon (n. 3), p. 59 
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the Renaissance in Italy (especially Machiavelli), James Harrington and his 
Commonwealth of Oceana in the seventeenth century to some other authors in the 
eighteenth century, including most prominently Montesquieu in France, the radical 
Whigs in England and the American revolutionaries.15 These authors had in common a 
similar idea of freedom, most famously depicted by Pettit as “freedom as non-
domination”, and a similar concern for the common good as the main goal of the 
political process. Nevertheless, there are important differences among them in issues 
related to the role of government or the extent of citizen’s participation in the polity. 
These differences had often led to distinguish between two strands of republicanism, 
labeled as conservative and democratic, or, probably more accurately, a tradition that 
emphasizes participation in self-government and a second tradition focused in the rule 
of law as the basis of individual freedom.16 As we will see in the next sections, the 
existence of at least these two strands in the classical republican thought is also reflected 
in differences in the interpretation of elections. Authors of the, say, “conservative” 
strand, like Cicero, Guicciardini or Hamilton differed from authors of the “democratic” 
or “participatory” strand in their views about the capacity of the people to select good 
politicians or about the probability of virtue among political representatives. However, 
the idea that I will try to develop in this paper is that all of them considered elections as 
a selection device instead than a mechanism for retrospective accountability. And, 
although elections in Republican Rome were different in many important points from 
elections in the American Republic or even the Italian city-republics of the Renaissance, 
I think that some aspects of elections, specifically their function as selection device or 
as mechanism of accountability, are sufficiently general to made intelligible a 
discussion, say, between Cicero’s and Guicciardini’s views about  these specific aspects 
of elections.  
I will present the idea that these authors viewed elections mainly as a mechanism to 
select “good types” in three steps. First, I will sustain that republican authors rarely 
considered elections as a mechanism of accountability. Instead, they considered other 
ways to control the government. Second, I will show that these authors considered 
elections as a way of selecting good types, or, as they usually said, to select the “natural 
                                                          
15 Philip Pettit (1997) Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
pp. 5-6 
  
16 Iseult Honohan (2002) Civic Republicanism. New York: Routledge, p.40. 
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aristocracy”. Third, I will present some of the mechanisms presented by these authors in 
order to explain how this “natural aristocracy” could be selected by the people.  
 
3. Republicanism, accountability and the selection of good types  
 
Republican authors, from Cicero to the Founders of the American Republic, were 
obsessed with the problem of how to assure that governments would respect the 
common good of the res publica, how to avoid arbitrary power. They advanced various 
solutions to this problem. Nearly none of them were related with the view of repeated 
elections as mechanisms of accountability. This was not because elections were not a 
feature of the political communities theorized by these authors. As Bernard Manin has 
shown, selection by lot of political representatives was very common in democratic 
Athens, the Roman Republic and the Italian city-republics, but elections were by no 
means absent in the political process.17 In Athens, selection by lot was widespread, but, 
nonetheless, some magistracies were filled by election. In Politics, Aristotle considered 
selection by lot as a feature of democratic government, but conceded that certain 
magistracies, those that required special capabilities, could be elective.18 Actually, 
around 100 magistracies were elective in Athens, while the remaining 600, plus the 
Council of Five Hundred, were selected by lot.19 In Rome most magistracies were 
elective.20 In the Italian city-republics, the members of the City Council and other 
magistracies were selected both by lot and by election.21 In Florence, for example, the 
selection of the highest offices, including membership in the Signoria after the 
Revolution of 1494, and, especially, after the law of 31 May of 1499, was a two-stages 
process that combined lot and a final vote in the Great Council.22 Some minor offices 
                                                          
17 Manin (n. 1) 
 
18Aristotle (1997) Política. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 1317b. Translators: 
Julián Marías and María Araújo 
  
19 Mogens Herman Hansen (1999) The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes. Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, pp. 152, 160, 233 
  
20 Andrew Lintott (1999) The Constitution of the Roman Republic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 95  
 
21 Daniel. Waley (1988) The Italian City-Republics. London and New York: Longman, p. 37 
  
22 H. C. Butters (1985) Governors and Government in Early Sixteenth-Century Florence. 1502-1519. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 34  
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were filled by majority vote in the Great Council.23 The writers of what Skinner24 calls 
the “neo roman” tradition in sixteenth-century England, including most prominently 
James Harrington, explicitly excluded lot as a means to select public officials, 
considering instead elections. Finally, the American revolutionaries never considered 
selection by lot, but elections, as the means to select the government. Nevertheless, 
elections were not generally considered mechanisms to make politicians accountable. 
There are only a few examples of this in the republican tradition. In his Discorso di 
Logrogno, Guicciardini says that if politicians know that the people reward those 
incumbents that have behaved correctly, this would be an incentive for good politicians 
and a restraint for bad ones.25 Actually, it is not clear whether the rewards that 
Guicciardini had in mind were reelection or rather good reputation among the people, 
and there is not a further elaboration of this topic in Guicciardini’s Discorso. The 
clearest example among the republican tradition of the understanding of elections as 
mechanisms of accountability, to my knowledge, is James Madison.26 In Federalist 
number 57 he explicitly considers repeated elections as a mechanism of accountability: 
“the House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the members an habitual 
recollection of their dependence on the people (…) they will be compelled to anticipate 
the moment when their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be renewed, and 
when they must descend to the level from which they were raised”.27 This idea was 
advanced also in Federalist number 52.28 
 Actually, the republican tradition is usually associated to other mechanisms 
rather than to elections in order to avoid the danger of arbitrary power, factionalism or 
corruption.  The theory of mixed government, the separation of powers and the theory 
of checks and balances are probably the most well-known institutional devices 
                                                          
23 Felix Gilbert (1965) Machiavelli and Guicciardini. Politics and History in Sixteenth Century Florence. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 18 
  
24 Quentin Skinner (1998) Liberty before Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
  
25 Francesco Guicciardini (1970) Discorso di Logrogno in Opere di Francesco Guicciardini, Volume 
Primo. Torino: Editrice Torinese, p. 262 
 
26 See David R. Weaver (1997) “Leadership, Locke and the Federalist”, American Journal of Political 
Science 41 (2): 420-446, p. 438 
  
27 James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay (1987) The Federalist Papers. London: Penguin, 
pp. 344-345  
  
28 Madison (n. 27), pp. 323-324 
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advanced by republican authors to control government. The theory of mixed 
government, in some ways the basis of the other two, was first elaborated in Athens to 
avoid the dangers of democracy, considered by Plato and Aristotle as the tyranny of the 
poor against the rich.29 The distribution of functions among social orders (the one, the 
few and the many) would compel them to put aside their sectional interests and rule 
with an eye to the common good. The doctrine of checks and balances retained the idea 
of the mixed government that, in order to prevent abuses of power, the various 
governmental bodies should be capable of actively resisting and counterbalancing each 
other. It lost the principle of the mixed government concerning the representation of 
different social forces in the different branches of the government. Finally, the doctrine 
of separation of powers, most famously advanced by Montesquieu but that can be traced 
at least to Guicciardini and Gianotti30, prohibited any influence of one of the 
functionally defined departments over another.31 Other mechanisms of control defended 
by republican authors included, for example, the rotation in office and the mandate 
limits. In republican Rome, consuls and tribunes, together with most of the minor 
offices, were usually elected for a year, and they could not run for a second term 
(making electoral accountability impossible).32 In republican Florence, for example, the 
members of the Signoria were replaced every two months.33 Harrington advocated a 
term limit of three years for each magistracy and renovation of the Senate each year.34 
Before Harrington, rotation was also advocated by Marchamont Nedham.35 This idea 
was also mentioned by Madison in The Federalist.36 Some countermajoritarian 
                                                          
29 Carl J. Richards (1994) The Founders and the Classics. Greece, Rome and the American 
Enlightenment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 124, 125 
  
30 J. G. A. Pocock (1975) The Machiavellian Moment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 128, 288 
  
31 Bernard Manin, “Checks, Balances and Boundaries: The Separation of Powers in the Constitutional 
Debate of 1787” in Biancamaria Fontana (ed) (1994) The Invention of the Modern Republic. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 30-31 
  
32 John P. McCormick (2001) “Machiavellian Democracy: Controlling Elites with Ferocious Populism”, 
American Political Science Review 95 (2): 297-313, pp. 300-301 
  
33 Manin (n. 1), pp. 55-56  
 
34 James Harrington (1992) The Commonwealth of Oceana. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
278-281 
  
35 Pocock (n. 30), pp. 381-382  
 
36 Madison (n. 27), p. 343  
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measures, like the bill of rights demanded by the Antifederalists, or the judicial review 
demanded by Hamilton in Federalist number 78 were also designated to control the 
government.37 Finally, in the history of the ancient republics and the Italian city-
republics of the Renaissance, we can find some mechanisms of accountability of public 
officials, like euthynai and eisangelia, two forms of scrutiny of magistrates at the end of 
their term in democratic Athens38, or the establishment of special committees to control 
magistrates at the end of their term in the Italian city-republics.39  
Therefore, republicans rarely considered elections as mechanisms of accountability. 
In fact, the retrospective evaluation of the policies of the government at the end of each 
term, either through competitive elections or through the appointment of special 
committees to control magistrates, was very uncommon in the republican thought, apart 
from the institutional practice in ancient Athens and some of the Italian city republics of 
the Renaissance. Some of the measures recommended by republicans to control the 
government were, indeed, incompatible with an interpretation of elections as 
mechanisms of accountability. Term limits is the most obvious example. If the 
incumbent cannot run for office in the next election, she has no incentives to anticipate 
the sanction of the electorate for her policies and, therefore, the election cannot fulfill its 
role as a mechanism of accountability.   
Why did not republican authors consider elections as mechanisms of accountability? 
There are at least two possibilities: either they considered elections as imperfect 
mechanisms to make politicians accountable or they considered retrospective 
evaluations of the incumbent’s performance, in general, unnecessary. I do not think that 
the first one was the case. As we have seen, there was not much room in the republican 
thought to the view of elections as mechanisms of accountability and, therefore, neither 
to the problems associated to it. Some of these problems, as I mentioned before, have to 
do with information asymmetries between representatives and constituents. There were 
indeed some intuitions in various republican authors about the presence of this 
asymmetric information. For example, Machiavelli considered that the governors had a 
wide capacity to mimic signals associated to what Bacharach and Gambetta would call 
                                                          
37 Hamilton (n. 27), pp. 437-440 
  
38 Jon Elster, 1999 “Accountability in Athenian Politics” in Przeworski, Manin and Stokes (eds) 
Democracy, Accountability and Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 266-270; 
Hansen (n. 19), pp. 213-218, 222 
  
39 Maurizio Viroli (1999) Repubblicanesimo. Rome: Editori Laterza, p. 37 
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“trust-warranting properties”, that is, properties of a trustworthy person.40 Those in 
power, Machiavelli says, can easily imitate the classical virtues. The princes can pretend 
to be honest, or liberal, when they are not.41 The Antifederalist Brutus also thought that 
it was most unlikely that people would know enough about their representatives. In his 
Essay number IV, he considered that “A great part of the people will probably not know 
the characters of their own members, much less that of a majority of those who will 
compose the federal assembly”.42 There was, therefore, certain recognition of the 
existence of these information asymmetries in some of the authors. But the information 
asymmetries mentioned by Machiavelli and Brutus were related to the character of the 
representatives, not to their policies. In fact, both authors were pointing to the problems 
of elections as mechanisms to select good types, not as mechanisms of accountability. 
Therefore, it does not seem that the reason to exclude elections as mechanisms of 
accountability was the problem of asymmetric information between representatives and 
constituents. Consider now the second explanation advanced above: that they viewed 
retrospective evaluation of the incumbent’s performance irrelevant. Obviously, control 
of the government was a key issue for republican authors. We have seen the various 
institutional mechanisms advanced by them in order to control the government: 
dispersion of power, bill of rights, judicial review and scrutiny of the politician’s 
performance at the end of the term. Only the last one resembles clearly a mechanism of 
accountability through a retrospective evaluation of the performance in office of the 
incumbent. As we have seen, this mechanism was extensively used in the cases of 
ancient Athens and the Italian city-republics of the Renaissance. My idea here is that 
republicans did not thought in elections as mechanisms of accountability because they 
considered that elections as mechanisms of selecting “good types”, what they 
sometimes called (since Harrington’s Oceana) the “natural aristocracy”, would be 
enough to achieve a virtuous government. If citizens select good types in the elections, 
they will achieve, at least in theory, the same result as if elections worked as pure 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
40 Michael Bacharach and Diego Gambetta, “Trust in Signs” in Karen Cook (ed) (2001) Trust in Society. 
New York: Russell Sage; Niccolò Machiavelli (1992) El príncipe. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, pp. 85, 91-
92; Niccolò Machiavelli (1996) Discursos sobre la primera década de Tito Livio. Madrid: Alianza 
Editorial, pp. 70-71, 217 
 
41 Machiavelli (1992) (n. 40), pp.  85, 91-92 
 
42 W. B. Allen and Gordon Lloyd (2002) The Essential Antifederalist. Boston: Rowman and Littlefield, p. 
181 
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mechanisms of accountability: the politicians will fulfill the voters’ interests or, in 
republican terms, the “common good”.43 When Guicciardini proposed in his Discorso di 
Logrogno the instauration in Florence of a gonfaloniere a vita, he thought that, if the 
election was made adequately, only men of virtue would fill that office, and, therefore, 
there was not a great danger of tyranny.44 Then, why did republican authors introduce 
the various institutional mechanisms of control mentioned above? Why Guicciardini, 
for example, proposed the establishment of a Senate to check the behavior of the 
gonfaloniere a vita? They probably thought that elections were, at best, imperfect ways 
to select good types, mainly due to lack of wisdom in the people (a recurrent topic in 
many of the republican authors, especially the more anti-democratic ones). Probably, 
they also considered those institutional mechanisms as separation of powers and checks 
and balances imperfect controls. Indeed, the presence of a third-part to enforce the 
contract between the principal and his agent (for example, a judicial system) certainly 
improves this enforcement, even if the third-part only intervenes randomly, but does not 
exclude the possibility of being cheated by the agent.45 Republican authors were aware 
of this: not even the most perfect institutional design excludes a certain degree of 
discretion by the representative.46 Given that both elections as mechanisms to select the 
natural aristocracy and institutional devices like separation of powers and checks and 
balances were imperfect considered separately, they advocated for a combination of 
both measures in order to avoid arbitrary power. 
It is interesting to notice that the presence of ulterior mechanisms of retrospective 
evaluation of the incumbent’s performance while in office were only judged necessary 
when elections as mechanisms for selecting good types were not available. As we have 
mentioned, the appointment of special committees to scrutiny the behavior of the 
                                                          
43 Fearon (n. 3). This is an important difference between Fearon’s conception of what constituted “good 
types” of politicians and the republican conception. For Fearon, good types are those that shared the 
voters’ interests. However, for most of the republicans, voting was not a means of combining divergent 
interests or, as Arrow claimed, a means of preference aggregation. For them it is a process that searches 
the common good of the community. This can coincide (or not) with majority vote. Therefore, in order to 
be a “good type” of politician in republican terms sharing the interest of the constituents is not enough. It 
would be necessary for those interests to coincide with the common good of the republic.   
 
44 Guicciardini (n. 25), p. 274 
 
45 Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort (2002) The Theory of Incentives. The Principal-Agent 
Model. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 364 
 
46 Philip Pettit, “Republican Theory and Political Trust” in Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi (eds) 
(1998) Trust and Governance. New York: Russell Sage, p. 301 
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magistrates at the end of their term was common in ancient Athens and the Italian city-
republics. In both cases, lot was the privileged way of selecting public officials. Given 
that public officials were selected randomly, there was no way to know in advance if 
those selected were virtuous or not. That is, selection by lot is not a good way to 
differentiate between “good” and “bad” types of politicians. This was adequately 
perceived by Harrington in Oceana: in ancient Athens, as the magistrates were selected 
by lot, they did not include the “natural aristocracy”.47 Given that selection by lot is 
incapable of screening to differentiate between types, an ex post mechanism of 
accountability –the scrutiny by especial committees- was more necessary in Athens and 
the Italian city republics than in a polity were elections were designed precisely to select 
good types.  
 It could be convenient to sum up the ideas presented so far. I have claimed that 
republican authors did not consider elections as mechanisms of accountability. 
Although I am not sure which is the explanation for this, one possibility is that they 
considered enough, in order to avoid arbitrary power, a previous mechanism of 
screening, to select ex ante good types for the public offices, combined with various 
institutional controls to the politicians while in office, like separation of powers and 
checks and balances. My idea is that elections, for republicans, were that mechanism of 
screening. This is what I will try to demonstrate next. 
 To demonstrate that republicans considered elections as mechanisms for 
selecting good types of politicians, I will present an argument in two steps. First, I will 
show that republicans thought that politicians could be two types: good or bad. This is 
necessary, because if politicians belonged just to one type (if all of them are good or all 
of them are bad), the selection of good types is trivial. Second, I will present some 
republican arguments about how elections can serve as mechanisms for selecting good 
types.  
 
4. The virtue of representatives 
 
For many republican authors, the representatives of the people could indeed be 
virtuous and, consequently, trustworthy. The trustworthiness of virtuous people was 
certainly obvious for republican authors like Cicero. According to Cicero, the virtuous 
                                                          
47 Harrington (n. 34), pp. 33, 38 
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man was gifted with the four cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, fortitude and 
moderation. Cicero mentioned also another set of virtues: honesty, magnanimity and 
liberality. Some of these characteristics of the virtuous man seem clearly related to 
trustworthiness. For example, justice is for Cicero the “defense of human society” and 
the “observance of the fidelity to the contracts”.48 This is clearly a characteristic related 
to trustworthiness. As Cicero himself said, justice is enough for trust: good people, fair 
and loyal, are never suspicious of fraud or injustice.49 Another feature of the virtuous 
man that is related to trustworthiness is prudence. We trust, Cicero says, in people that 
are more intelligent than we are. Nevertheless, justice is for Cicero a more important 
characteristic for trustworthiness. Justice is what Bacharach and Gambetta would call a 
“trust-warranting property”.50 I think that all republican authors would agree with 
Cicero in considering that virtue, and the characteristics associated to it, is a “trust-
warranting property”. Did the republicans think that there were “good” and virtuous 
politicians ready to be selected by the people? Cicero indeed thought so. He recognized 
that many politicians were not trustworthy: for him, the highest injustice is from those 
that pretend to be honest when they are cheating you and these injustices are more often 
found in politics.51 Nevertheless, he considered that there were virtuous politicians. In 
pro Sestio he explicitly mentioned two types of politicians: “optimates”, who sought to 
please all the best men, and “populares”, demagogues who sought to please the 
masses.52 These two types corresponded to his ideas of “good” and “bad” types of 
politicians, respectively. Although he does not explicitly mention the notion of “natural 
aristocracy”, he considered that these “good” types of politicians, people superior in 
virtue and in spirit, have been provided by nature.53 Some of the earlier Italian 
humanists, like Campagni and Latini, also recognized the possibility of trustworthy 
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leaders, providing that they had been selected adequately.54 Guicciardini considered that 
the political leaders, the optimates, had intelligence and prudence.55 The second one, at 
least, is a trust-warranting property. He even thought (as, actually, Cicero did) that the 
optimates, the few, were the only ones capable of virtue.56 This is not to say that he 
considered that all potential politicians were trustworthy or, in our terminology, “good 
types”. His defense of the mixed government and other controls was based, among other 
things, on his fear of the corruption of the ottimati if they had a monopoly of power. He 
considered that all the ottimati had two virtues especially adequate for government: 
practical experience and the pursuit of honor, but his fear against warranting to the 
aristocracy a monopoly of power reflected the view that much of the aristocrats were 
not virtuous enough.57  
The most famous characterization of the virtue of representatives is captured in the 
notion of “natural aristocracy”. It was a contribution of James Harrington in his 
Commonwealth of Oceana.58 It implied that, in any polity, certain men would possess 
greater talent than others. This percentage of “wiser men”, always present in all human 
societies, is the natural aristocracy, “diffused by God throughout the whole body of 
mankind”.59 The idea of a representative assembly of the more virtuous was shared by 
the other authors of the “neo roman” British tradition.60 The concept of natural 
aristocracy was also extensively used by the American revolutionaries. They generally 
considered the Senate as the adequate place for this “natural aristocracy”.61 Jefferson 
mentioned the term frequently, and viewed his proposal for educative reform as a way 
to open the society’s “natural aristocracy” to all talents.62 He considered that this 
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“natural aristocracy” was grounded in virtue and talents and that it was “the most 
precious gift of nature for the instruction, the trusts and government of society”.63 In 
this, he agreed with John Adams, who also frequently mentioned the notion of “natural 
aristocrats”.64 In The Federalist Papers there are also frequent references to the virtue of 
representatives. Against some interpretations that consider Federalist number 10 as a 
rejection of classical republicanism and the idea of civic virtue, it seems that the 
representatives’ virtue was at the heart of Madison’s defense of the Constitution.65 He 
considered that representatives were “citizens whose wisdom may best discern the true 
interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of country will be least likely to 
sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations”.66 In all republics, Madison said, 
there is always a given percentage of virtuous men fit for the role of representatives. 
Hamilton also considered in Federalist number 76 that “the institution of delegated 
power implies that there is a portion of virtue and honor among mankind”.67 All the, 
say, optimistic views about the presence of “good types” agreed, then, that there is a 
certain number of virtuous people in the republic and that these virtuous people have 
some trust-warranting properties that make them trustworthy. A more pessimistic view 
can be found, for example, in the English radical Whigs, the writings of Thomas Paine 
or the works of some Antifederalist writers. According to all of them, political leaders 
are generally not trustworthy. Thomas Gordon, one of the most conspicuous 
representatives of the radical Whig tradition in XVIII century England, considered that 
“What is good for the people is bad for the government, and what is good for the 
government, is bad for the people”.68 Thomas Paine had a somewhat similar position.69 
Nevertheless, it could be said that the radical Whigs and Thomas Paine were not talking 
about government in general, but about a certain government, in this case the British 
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one. In authors like Machiavelli or the American Antifederalists the arguments about 
the government’s trustworthiness are somewhat more general. As we have seen before, 
Machiavelli considered that the governors can easily imitate the classical virtues. The 
Antifederalists, most notably Brutus, thought that government by representatives was a 
necessity in big republics (as opposed to “pure democracies”, where there is no 
representation). In general, the Antifederalists thought that men could not be trusted to 
respect the rights of others when governing. Take, for example, the following statement 
by Richard Henry Lee: “the most expressed declarations and reservations are necessary 
to protect the just rights and liberty of mankind from the silent powerful and ever acting 
conspiracy of those who govern”.70 Only if the representatives resemble the people 
closely enough to possess the same sentiments and interest as the people, there is a 
possibility that people can trust their representatives.71 As Richard Henry Lee said “a 
full and equal representation is that which possesses the same interest, feelings, 
opinions and views the people themselves would were they all assembled”.72 
Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that these authors excluded the possibility 
of virtuous politicians. In his work Arte della Guerra, Machiavelli compared the merits 
of republics and monarchies, concluding that republics produce more virtuous leaders 
than monarchies.73 It seems that Harrington’s notion of “natural aristocracy” influenced 
even the radical Whigs, who sometimes recognized the existence of such group of 
men.74 What differentiated authors like Harrington or Jefferson from Machiavelli and 
the Antifederalists was probably the probability of “natural aristocrats” in a polity. If the 
virtue of representatives were a random variable, Harrington would probably consider 
that the probability of virtue was closer to 1 and Machiavelli would consider it closer to 
0, but both of them would agree that politicians could be, nonetheless, of two types. 
This is the idea captured in Agrippa’s Letter XV, when it says that in government there 
will probably be more bad men than good ones.75 
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 It seems, then, that republican authors indeed considered the existence of two 
types of politicians: good and bad. I go next to the second step of my argument: how 
they considered that the people could differentiate between the two types. 
 
5. The selection of good types 
 
In the previous section I have presented the idea that republican authors generally 
saw elections not as mechanisms of accountability, but of selecting what they termed 
“natural aristocrats”: wise and virtuous politicians that equated their interest with the 
interest of the people. Indeed, if the people could discriminate between good and bad 
types, the election as a selection of good types could reach, at least theoretically, the 
same outcome as the election as accountability: the government would fulfill the 
interests of the voters: in elections as accountability, because politicians anticipate the 
voters’ sanction, and in elections as selection of good types, because the interests of the 
government and the interests of the people are the same. But, can the people really 
differentiate between types? What were the republicans’ ideas about this topic? 
Republicans vary in their confidence in the capacity of the people to select good 
leaders. In this case, the more conservative authors usually considered the people 
incapable of virtue but capable of selecting good leaders. Cicero, for example, thought 
that the common people (the “many poor”) were ignorant and ready to be governed by 
their passions.76 Guicciardini easily agreed with this: the members of Florence’s Great 
Council were “poor and ignorant”, and they had “little capacity”.77 However, both also 
agreed that, despite these preferences, the people tend to elect good representatives, 
probably because they know that their interests are best served by the few virtuous 
(although this did not mean that the people’s capacity to select good leaders was 
perfect). Cicero thought that the popular assembly could easily distinguish between 
serious politicians and demagogues.78 For Guicciardini, the many are differentiated 
from the few by their capacity to judge of others’ fitness for offices they do not 
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themselves seek.79 The people, Guicciardini said, know wise and prudent politicians by 
their reputation and fame, and this is enough for them to distribute wisely most of the 
magistracies (although sometimes he was not so confident about the capacity of the 
people to select good leaders for the highest magistracies, like Florence’s 
gonfaloniere).80 According to Montesquieu, numerous examples in Greece and Rome 
showed that in elections the people are capable of discerning the merit of the most 
capable.81 Madison shared Cicero and Guicciardini’s rather conservative view that 
common people were not capable of virtue, and so were ready to constitute factions in 
order to pursue their selfish interests against the common good of the Republic.82 
According to him, the problem lies in the fact that certain kinds of information cannot 
be acquired by private means, but only by “actual service in the legislature”.83 That is, 
he thought that some information was intrinsically politicians’ private information so 
people cannot rule by themselves and cannot even judge the political proposals of 
politicians adequately. Madison and some of the Founders had some doubts about the 
capacity of the people to select good representatives. Although Madison said in 
Federalist number 55 that the genius of the American people would prevent the election 
of tyrants,84 he usually considered the people apt to be dominated by their passions.85 
Nevertheless, his view about the capacity of the people is not as pessimistic as 
Hamilton’s, who advocated for a much less passive role for the people in the 
Republic.86 Hamilton considered that demagogues, who misuse the public trust placed 
on them, often govern the Republic’s will, and usually portrayed the common people as 
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governed by their passions.87 Other Federalist, like Jonathan Jackson, considered that 
the people were incapable not just of governing but of selecting good representatives.88 
The more democratic republican writers rejected this conservative and anti-democratic 
view of the people’s preferences. Machiavelli is a good example of this. He considered 
the people generally prudent and wise (actually wiser and more prudent than princes).89 
Some of the commonwealthmen of sixteenth-century England shared Machiavelli’s 
view. Algernon Sidney, for example, considered that a popular assembly could be 
capable of some passions and be deceived, but they are not so easily deceived as one 
man.90 Thomas Paine also considered the people wise and prudent, and added that the 
better guarantee for individual rights (including the property right) was indeed a popular 
government.91 Jefferson’s model of agrarian democracy was very optimistic about the 
probability of the attainment of an enlightened citizenship through public education and 
the autonomy given by the possession of land. In general terms, he believed in the 
“integrity and good sense” of the common man.92 The more optimistic of the American 
revolutionaries, like Jefferson, actually stressed the capacity of the common people to 
elect those who had integrity and merit.93 In Jefferson words: “leave to the citizens the 
free election and separation of the aristoi from the pseudo-aristoi, of the wheat from the 
chaff. In general they will elect the real good and wise”.94 
Therefore, some republicans doubted the capacity of the people to select good 
leaders while some of them held a much more optimistic position about it  but, how did 
people actually elect good types of politicians? How could they differentiate good types 
from bad ones? The republicans’ responses to these questions were, in my opinion, a 
combination of institutional measures related to electoral rules and the use by the 
electorate of various types of cues and heuristics.  
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The measures related to the electoral rules stressed the frequency of the elections, 
the size of the electoral districts and the requisite of property for representatives.  
The aim of the advocates of maximum frequency of elections was to assure that the 
interests of the representatives and the interest of the people were the same. Thomas 
Paine, the Antifederalists and authors like John Adams considered that the best way for 
the representatives to have the same interests as the people is that the assembly was an 
exact portrait of the people at large.95 The dissenters in the Convention of Pennsylvania, 
for example, thought that without a representation possessing the same interests, 
feelings and views “which the people themselves would possess, were they all 
assembled”, the outcome would be lack of confidence of the people in their 
representatives.96 As Melancton Smith would say, the representatives “should be a true 
picture of the people”.97 This same idea is advanced by Thomas Paine in Common 
Sense.98 If elections were very frequent, the representatives could not separate 
themselves from the people. Applying this principle, all the States of revolutionary 
America but South Carolina, established annual elections for their representatives.99 
Notice that the frequency of the elections was not seen as a mechanism of accountability 
but as a way of selecting “good types” of representatives: politicians that shared the 
people’s interests.  
The size of the electoral districts was also a measure to select good types of 
representatives. Here the positions were very different, from those that advocated small 
districts to those that defended districts as big as possible. Those that thought that the 
representatives should be a true picture of the people were in favor of small districts. 
This was the position of the Antifederalists. For example, Brutus considered that the 
smaller the district, the more probable that the representatives resembled the people.100 
The reason is that in small districts it is easier to know the character of the potential 
representatives. At the other extreme we find Madison, the advocate of big districts. 
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Madison did not think that representatives should resemble the people as much as 
possible. In fact, he thought that the virtue of the representatives meant precisely that 
they had to be different from the people: they would have more prudence, wisdom and 
experience than the people. Big districts would mean a great distance between the 
representatives and the people and, therefore, more difference between them.101 In the 
words of the Federalist James Wilson, large electoral districts were a protection against 
both “petty demagogues and parochialism”.102  
The other electoral rule occasionally advocated by republicans was a requisite of 
property for representatives. The idea that property could be correlated to the possession 
of virtue, that is, that property is a proxy of natural aristocracy, is a constant in 
republican thought. Although not all republicans agreed with that, many of them 
discussed this topic. Cicero, for example, considered that people sometimes use 
erroneous signals to judge the politicians’ personal characteristics. Wealth is clearly this 
type of signal: occasionally (although not always) people confuse virtue with opulence 
and wealth. Nevertheless, although he did not necessarily identified wealth with virtue, 
in practice he usually considered the members of the Senate, the wealthiest families of 
Rome, as the most virtuous: those that accumulate great possessions show more 
industry, skills and even rationality than the impoverished.103 The scholastic authors of 
the beginnings of the Renaissance thought that property was a good signal to select 
virtuous leaders.104 In the eighteenth century, property was also considered a signal of 
virtue but this did not necessarily mean wealth. However, during the American 
Revolution it seems that personal wealth was considered by some of the Founders as a 
proxy of virtue, given that it was thought that wealth generally was correlated to 
wisdom and education.105 Ten of the thirteen States established a Senate and property 
qualifications for Senate candidates (all of them established property qualifications, 
although lower, for the lower House).106 In the Convention of Philadelphia, the requisite 
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of property was considered essential both to protect the natural right itself and to select 
virtuous representatives.107  
The idea that property was a signal of virtue leads us to the other way, besides the 
electoral rules, republicans took into account to explain how elections served to select 
good types. The people could use external signals to differentiate between types. That 
is, they could use certain heuristics or cues to select good types. As Machiavelli said in 
the Discorsi “the people judge in the elections according to the surest signals about the 
men’s character”.108 In this sense, their ideas are quite similar to the modern 
characterization of elections as a way of selecting good types. Fearon also thinks that, to 
distinguish “good types” from “bad types”, citizens can use a variety of signals. He 
considers that non policy cues about the character of the politicians are relevant pieces 
of information for the selection model. In recent years, a series of authors have 
advanced two claims regarding these cues and heuristics: first, low informed citizens 
use a variety of shortcuts, heuristics or cues when forming their political opinions. 
Second, the use of these shortcuts does not necessarily lead to mistaken political 
opinions. Instead, it is claimed that, by using these shortcuts, citizens can reach political 
decisions as rational as those they could have reached if they had all the relevant pieces 
of information.109 Republican authors usually assumed that the people lack adequate 
information about politics. As we have seen, Cicero, for example, thought that people 
were ignorant and incapable of virtue. The most conservatives among the civic 
humanists, most notably Guicciardini, agreed with this.110 And, according to Madison, 
much political information was politician’s private information.111 However, they 
thought that the people could use a variety of signals to discern the politicians’ type. We 
have seen their opinion about property. For some of them, it was a clear signal 
correlated to virtue. For Cicero, being a good orator could also be considered a signal of 
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virtue and the people generally distinguish the good orators that are really virtuous.112 
He thought that the people could always select good politicians using as a signal their 
quality as orators, although sometimes he considered that the people were deceived by 
demagogues, like the Gracci. We can interpret that Cicero thought that the people could 
select real good types but sometimes selected bad types that mimicked the behavior of 
good types. Nevertheless, he also considered that, in the long run, virtue could not be 
imitated successfully.113 Montesquieu considered frugality a good signal of virtue.114 
Finally, as we have seen, the Antifederalist writers, and other American revolutionaries, 
like John Adams, considered likeness to the people as the surest signal of the 
representative sharing the interests of his constituents.  
However, not all authors agreed about the capacity to select good politicians by the 
use of cues and heuristics about the politicians’ personal characteristics. We have seen 
that Machiavelli thought that, in the elections, the people used the surest signals about 
the politicians’ personal characteristics, and he even concedes that these pieces of 
information about personal characteristics are a reasonable shortcut to select good 
agents.115 However, as we have also seen, in various passages of The Prince and the 
Discorsi, Machiavelli considered that the governors had a wide capacity of mimicking 
signals associated to “trust-warranting properties”.116 Contrary to Cicero, he thought 
that the imitation of virtue was not only possible but  indefinitely successful, because 
men are candid and prone to self-deceit.117 If bad types can mimic the behavior of good 
types, the use of heuristics is a precarious base for political judgment.118 Therefore, 
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Machiavelli’s counsel to the people was that in order to establish a free republic, it is 
necessary to think that all men are bad and untrustworthy.119 We can interpret the 
proposals of those authors that advocated for an educational reform to enhance the 
enlightenment of the people in this light. Take Jefferson for example. In a letter to John 
Adams, Jefferson discusses the issue of how to differentiate the natural aristocracy from 
what he calls “artificial aristocracy”, not based on merit. He discusses some external 
characteristics naturally associated to the aristoi, the most talented as ground for 
distinction. Specifically, he cites beauty, good humor and politeness but considers these 
attributes as mere auxiliaries of distinction.120 Given that external characteristics are 
precarious signals of merit, Jefferson defended the creation of a school system for the 
education of the people, both to open the natural aristocracy to all classes in society and 
to enhance the political sophistication of the people, for them to better differentiate good 
types from bad types.   
 
6. Conclusion 
 
  In this paper I have defended the idea that republican authors did not interpret 
elections as mechanisms of accountability but as a way of selecting “good types”, 
politicians that would pursue the common good, instead of their factional interests. I 
have tried to demonstrate that republicans envisaged a combination of elections to select 
the “natural aristocracy” of society and controls for governors while in office to keep 
the public officials free from corruption. I have presented my argument in two steps. 
First, I have demonstrated that republican authors considered that politicians could be 
two types, good and bad. Second, I have presented some republican ideas about how the 
elections could serve to select the good types. Some of these ideas are, curiously, quite 
similar to a recent stream of literature in political science about the use of cues and 
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heuristics in order to make low informed political judgments. These ideas fall short, 
however, from Jefferson’s ideal of an enlightened and autonomous citizenry capable of 
judging the character of politicians without the help of precarious cues about those 
politicians’ personal characteristics.    
 Contemporary debates about republicanism have tended to ignore the 
contribution of republican authors to the understanding of elections. This is to some 
extent understandable, given that the advocacy of widespread participation is one of the 
distinctive features of modern republicanism against the liberal view of participation 
circumscribed to voting in periodical elections. The arguments presented in this paper 
can be seen as a reminder that periodical elections is not a democratic institution 
confined to the liberal tradition, but one theorized previously by classical republicans. 
Given what we know about the problems of elections as mechanisms of retrospective 
accountability, as well as about the public’s interpretation of elections, it could even be 
said that republicans’ view was somewhat more accurate than the usual liberal account 
of elections. Are these classical republican ideas useful to contemporary debates in 
political science about elections? Indeed, as I have pointed out occasionally, there are 
some common ideas between classical republicans and some contemporary views about 
elections. The consideration of elections as a selection device, defended by Fearon, was 
in fact anticipated, as I have tried to demonstrate, by classical republicans. Some cues 
and heuristic presented by modern political scientists as means to select “good” 
politicians by low-informed citizens remind similar ideas advanced by the historical 
republicans. However, it is doubtful that classical republicans have something to teach 
contemporary political science about elections, apart from the (not irrelevant) fact  that 
some ideas considered “new” by modern political scientists are not really that “new”.  
